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s u m m a r y 
Objectives: Patients requiring haemodialysis are at increased risk of serious illness with SARS-CoV-2 in- 
fection. To improve the understanding of transmission risks in six Scottish renal dialysis units, we utilised 
the rapid whole-genome sequencing data generated by the COG-UK consortium. 
Methods: We combined geographical, temporal and genomic sequence data from the community and 
hospital to estimate the probability of infection originating from within the dialysis unit, the hospital or 
the community using Bayesian statistical modelling and compared these results to the details of epidemi- 
ological investigations. 
Results: Of 671 patients, 60 (8.9%) became infected with SARS-CoV-2, of whom 16 (27%) died. Within-unit 
and community transmission were both evident and an instance of transmission from the wider hospital 
setting was also demonstrated. 
Conclusions: Near-real-time SARS-CoV-2 sequencing data can facilitate tailored infection prevention and 
control measures, which can be targeted at reducing risk in these settings. 
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The British Infection Association. 
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i MagNA Pure 96 system (Roche, Penzberg, Germany), Abbott M20 0 0 (Abbott, ntroduction 
The emergent SARS-CoV-2 virus which causes COVID-19 is as- 
ociated with increased morbidity and mortality in older individ- 
als and in those with chronic diseases. 1 , 2 Chronic kidney disease 
nd pre-existing conditions that may increase the risk of renal fail- 
re, such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes mellitus and hyper- 
ension, are significantly associated with an increased risk of death 
n COVID-19. 3 , 4 Individuals requiring haemodialysis in hospital are 
lso at increased risk of nosocomial infection due to prolonged 
utpatient dialysis (typically three times weekly for four hours per 
ession) and to community infection due to regular travel on public 
r hospital transport, often with other patients. 5–7 The case fatal- 
ty rate in dialysis patients has been reported as 20–30% compared 
ith 1–2% in patients not requiring haemodialysis. 8–11 
Whole-genome pathogen sequencing has become increasingly 
ccessible. Its utility in the context of evolving outbreaks has 
een demonstrated with Ebola, Zika and hospital outbreak inves- 
igations. 12–15 The COVID-19 Genomics UK (COG-UK) Consortium, 
unded by the UK Department of Health and Social Care, UK Re- 
earch and Innovation (UKRI) and the Wellcome Sanger Institute, 
as set up to enable real-time sequencing at a population level 
nd to facilitate the investigation and management of hospital- 
ssociated infections, providing policymakers with information on 
ntroductions and transmission events. 16–18 
We aimed to investigate the genetic epidemiology of COVID-19 
nfection from patients attending six Scottish renal dialysis unit(s) 
RDU) using a Bayesian statistical analysis framework incorporat- 
ng temporal, geographical and genetic sequence data. These re- 
ults were evaluated alongside traditional epidemiological inves- 
igations. We further investigate the clinical impact of COVID-19 
nfection on haemodialysis patients and incorporate the informa- 
ion obtained using combined genetic and epidemiological data to 
nform future infection control strategies. 
ethods 
tudy design and participants 
The Glasgow Renal and Transplant Unit based at the Queen 
lizabeth University Hospital and University Hospital Monklands 
erve a combined population of approximately 2.16 million peo- 
le across West and Central Scotland under NHS Greater Glasgow 
nd Clyde, NHS Forth Valley and NHS Lanarkshire Health Boards. 
hese institutions provide haemodialysis treatment for 828 outpa- 
ients across eight RDUs (numbers extracted 1st March 2020). Use 
f anonymised data was approved by the Local Privacy Advisory 
roup of NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde ‘Safe Haven’ on behalf of 
he West of Scotland Ethics Committee (approval GSH/20/RE/001). 
ollow up was until 4th June 2020. From 2nd March 2020, patients 
ttending for dialysis with symptoms of COVID-19 were tested for 
ARS-CoV-2 by nasopharyngeal swab. We report data on the six 
DUs (RDU 1–6, number of patients treated with dialysis = 671) 
ith any patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection. Initially, personal 
rotective equipment (fluid-resistant surgical masks, eye protec- 
ion, aprons and gloves) (PPE) was not recommended by UK and 
cottish Governments for HCWs caring for patients, unless clinical 
ndex of suspicion was high for COVID-19 or for aerosol generat- 
ng procedures. RDU1 instigated PPE for HCWs and surgical masks 
or patients whilst travelling to, from and during dialysis on 23rd 
arch in response to earlier infections. From 3rd April 2020, the 
K-recommendations changed to include any close patient contact. 





2 hared-patient transport discontinued. Until 5th April HCWs were 
neligible for SARS-CoV-2 testing unless hospitalised, being advised 
o self-isolate for 7 days in keeping with Scottish government pol- 
cy. 
aboratory diagnosis 
Nasopharyngeal swabs in viral PCR solution (1:1 ratio of Easy- 
ag Nuclisens Extraction Buffer (BioMerieux, France) and EMEM) 
ere extracted and tested according to the availability of assays 
t the diagnostic laboratory. i Surplus RNA extract was collected for 
equencing with ethical approval from the NHSGGC biorepository 
16/WS/0207NHS). 
equencing 
Sequencing was performed on either the ONT MinION/GridION 
r the Illumina MiSeq platform, as previously described. 16 Briefly, 
ibraries were prepared in accordance with the ARTIC net- 
ork protocols (v1 and v2) (https://artic.network/ncov-2019). For 
anopore reads the ARTIC-nCov-2019 bioinformatics protocol was 
sed, reads were size filtered, demultiplexed, trimmed with Pore- 
hop (https://github.com/rrwick/Porechop) and mapped against 
he reference strain Wuhan-Hu-1 (GenBank accession number 
N908947), followed by clipping of primer regions. Variants were 
alled using Nanopolish 0.11.3 (https://github.com/jts/nanopolish). 
or Illumina, reads were trimmed with trim_galore (bioinformat- 
cs.babraham.ac.uk/projects/trim_galore/) and mapped with BWA 20 
o the Wuhan-Hu-1 reference sequence, followed by primer trim- 
ing and consensus calling with iVar. 21 A read coverage of least 
0 was used for the consensus. 
equence data 
Consensus sequences with > 90% coverage were included. 
ll consensus genomes are available from the GISAID database 
https://www.gisaid.org), the COG-UK consortium website (https:// 
ww.cogconsortium.uk/data/) and BAM files from the European 
ucleotide Archive’s Sequence Read Archive service, BioProject PR- 
EB37886 (https://www.ebi.ac.uk/ena/data/view/PRJEB37886). 
hylogenetic and probabilistic analysis 
Retrospective phylogenetic analysis of whole-genome sequences 
as performed as follows. All full genomes of SARS-CoV-2 from 
cotland sequenced as part of the COG-UK consortium were in- 
luded and aligned using MAFFT v7.310 and with the HKY + I + G4 
ucleotide substitution model determined by modeltest. The global 
ineage and UK lineage assignments for the dialysis samples were 
etermined using civet (https://github.com/artic-network/civet). 
We applied a novel algorithm, the Sequence Reporting Tool 
SRT) to estimate the probability of healthcare- vs community- 
cquired infection in each case, based on the statistical approach 
eveloped for the COG-UK hospital-onset COVID-19 infection 
HOCI) study (https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT04405934). 22 
he approach is based on Bayesian principles and involves com- 
arison of the proportion of similar viral sequences (with max- 
mum pairwise SNP difference of two, with no difference where 
here is an overlap in ambiguous nucleotide codes or an ‘N’ in ei- 
her sequence) observed within potential locations of infection for hicago, US) or Cobas® 6800 Systems (Roche). SARS-CoV-2 was detected using one 
f three RT-PCR assays: RdRp gene/E gene. 19 RdRp gene/N gene (Abbott RealTime 
ARS-CoV-2 assay, Chicago, US) or the ORF1a/b and E gene (Cobas® SARS-CoV-2, 
oche). 
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Fig. 1. Cumulative cases of COVID-19 cases (left y -axis) with arrows demonstrating 
additional infection control measures (narrow arrow - RDU1, wide arrow covers the 
dates for all other RDUs). Cumulative infection numbers for Scotland are on the 











































he case of interest: i) patients’ RDU and elsewhere in this hos- 
ital, ii) inpatient ward and hospital (if the patient was admitted) 
ll within the prior three weeks; along with a weighted propor- 
ion of similar sequences in the local community of the patient 
ithin the prior six weeks based on the outer postcode of their 
ome address. There are 61 districts based on this outcode (49 in 
lasgow and 12 in Lanarkshire). We assumed 0.5 prior probability 
f infection within the RDU before consideration of sequence data, 
nd the prior probability of admission-related infection among the 
npatients was based on the interval from admission to diagno- 
is and the incubation distribution of COVID-19. 23 The SRT algo- 
ithm outputs two posterior probabilities in all cases: that of ac- 
uiring the virus directly from the RDU (p_RDU) and that of ac- 
uiring the infection through use of facilities within the hospital 
ut not in the RDU (e.g. toilets, cafes, lobbies, or shared trans- 
ort, etc) (p_hRDU). A posterior probability (p_RDU) of 1 indicates 
hat the transmission occurred within the RDU; if the p_RDU stays 
t 0.5 then it remains unclear where the transmission occurred; 
f p_RDU is 0 then the infection was most likely community ac- 
uired. If the haemodialysis patient was an inpatient and contin- 
ed to attend the RDU at the time of COVID-19 diagnosis, the SRT 
lgorithm also gives the probability of acquiring the infection from 
he ward of admission (p_wADM) and that of infection elsewhere 
n that hospital (p_hADM). The SRT algorithm was coded in R ver- 
ion 3.6.0, using the ape v5.3 package for calculation of pairwise 
NP differences and PostcodesioR v0.1.1 and gmt v2.0-1 packages 
o calculate distances between postcodes. 22 
urvival statistics 
Comparisons were made between patients who lived and died 
ollowing SARS-CoV-2 infection. At the time of analysis, no patients 
ho were still alive were critically ill or requiring oxygen therapy. 
he mortality rates were calculated for patients requiring dialysis 
xpressed as deaths per 10 0 0 patient days were calculated over 
he three months 1st March-31st May 2020. 
esults 
escription of cases, treatments and outcomes in patients requiring 
aemodialysis with COVID-19 
In total, 60 of 671 (8.9%) patients requiring HD were diagnosed 
ith COVID-19 infection during 1st March-31st May 2020. 16/60 
atients (26.7%) died; with COVID-19 as the certified cause of 
eath. There were no statistically significant differences in the clin- 
cal characteristics and associated co-morbidities between those 
ho died and those who survived ( Table 1 ). The median time 
rom positive SARS-CoV-2 test to death was 10.5 days (range 0-29 
ays). Two patients required intensive care (of whom one died). 
o patients received ‘specific’ therapy for COVID-19 (e.g. dexam- 
thasone, remdesivir, tocilizumab). Compared to the corresponding 
hree-month periods 2018–19 (mean deaths 44/quarter year), there 
ere 16 more deaths in patients undergoing outpatient haemodial- 
sis in the same RDUs, equivalent to 0.797 deaths per 10 0 0 pa-
ient days in all patients requiring haemodialysis during 1st March- 
1st May 2020 compared to 0.628 deaths per 10 0 0 patient days as 
ean of the corresponding period during 2017–2018 (equivalent to 
 27.0% increase) ( Fig. 1 ). 
enomic and epidemiological investigation 
Residual RNA extract from 53 of 60 patients with SARS-CoV-2 
ositive samples were obtained for virus genome sequencing. 39 
f these sequences plus one from a healthcare worker were of suf- 
cient quality and coverage for further analysis. The samples be- 3 onged to 13 different UK lineages ( Fig. 2 ). Whilst a number of pa-
ients had indistinguishable sequences from the same UK lineage 
nd shared dialysis sessions, some fell outwith phylogenetic lin- 
ages, providing evidence of community-transmission. The recent 
ntroduction of SARS-CoV-2 into the human population and its rel- 
tively low mutation rate, mean sequences in the same UK lineage 
nd phylotype cannot be interpreted as direct transmission events, 
ith further temporal and epidemiological data required to quan- 
ify the probability of transmission. Conversely, sequences from dif- 
erent UK lineages would disprove direct transmission. Epidemio- 
ogical investigation identified clusters of SARS-CoV-2 positive pa- 
ients with shared dialysis sessions and sometimes transport and 
his was analysed with the phylogenetic data ( Figs. 2 and 3 ). We
ound five of the six RDUs spanning two health boards in the West 
f Scotland had evidence of unit-linked transmission events. 
DU1 
In RDU1, viral sequences from seven haemodialysis patients 
nd one HCW from the same unit clustered within the UK40 lin- 
age ( Fig. 3 ). Five of these sequences were indistinguishable to 
ach other (CVR248, CVR284, CVR495, CVR987 and CVR1404), sug- 
estive of within-unit transmission. Applying the SRT, we found 
he probability of within-unit transmission in RDU1 was inde- 
erminate based on sequence data alone ranging from 0.53 to 
.68. Further epidemiological analysis suggested transmission in 
ome cases – for example, CVR248 and CVR1404 had indistin- 
uishable sequences and shared dialysis sessions ( Fig. 3 ). How- 
ver, CVR284 and CVR495, also with indistinguishable sequences, 
id not overlap with each other or anyone else on the unit, sug- 
esting community-acquisition. HCW, CVR987, having been in di- 
ect contact with CVR248, self-isolated on 22nd March, prior to 
esting positive seven days later. However, this viral sublineage of 
K40, was widespread in the community, with 63 other indistin- 
uishable sequences detected within the geographical location of 
DU1 and patient communities; so this transmission could not re- 
iably be inferred. Two of the seven patients whose sequences de- 
ived from the wider UK40 lineage (CVR780 and CVR1404) ( Fig. 3 ) 
ere linked epidemiologically, sharing both dialysis sessions and 
ransport from home to the unit. However, the estimated proba- 
ilities of within unit transmission for CVR780 and CVR1404 were 
.63 and 0.54, respectively. This result was supported by close in- 
pection of the data. CVR780 was found to have tested positive 
or SARS-CoV-2 six days prior to CVR1404 and had a single nu- 
leotide polymorphism relative to the Wuhan reference not found 
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Table 1 
Demographic, laboratory and imaging data of patients with COVID-19 with comparisons between patients who died compared to survivors. Laboratory test 
results are taken from the date closest to diagnosis of SARS-CoV2 (same day in 85% of cases with only two cases where laboratory day > 2 days from date 
of diagnosis). All patients requiring haemodialysis are registered on the Strathclyde Electronic Renal Patient Record (SERPR; Vitalpulse, UK) which records 
clinical, laboratory and imaging data for clinical care, audit and research. Using SERPR we extracted anonymised clinical data on all patients treated with 
haemodialysis with a positive test for SARS-CoV-2 infection. The Scottish Government provides online calculators allowing use of patient postcode to generate 
divisions of socioeconomic deprivation, the Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation (SIMD) (http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/SIMD). Deprivation deciles 
were calculated and categorized into most deprived deciles with 1 corresponding to most deprived and 10 as least deprived. Cause of death was certified by 
each patient’s clinical team with registration with the Scottish Mortality Audit in Renal Replacement Therapy (SMARRT). 30 Radiological imaging was coded 
using the British Thoracic Society Classification for COVID-19. (https://www.bsti.org.uk/media/resources/files/BSTI_COVID_CXR_Proforma_v.3-1.pdf). Values are 
presented as means (standard deviation) or medians (inter-quartile range) and comparisons between groups were made using t-test, Kruskal-Wallis, Chi-square 
and Fisher’s exact test as appropriate. Statistics were performed on Minitab Version 19.2020.1.0 (Minitab, State College, Pennsylvania). 
All patients ( n = 60) SD/IQR/% Alive ( n = 44) SD/IQR/% Died ( n = 16) SD/IQR p 
Age (yrs) 67 •4 13 •7 66 •2 14 •9 70 •6 9 •6 0 •19 
Male (%) 33 (55) 22 (36 •7) 11 (18 •3) 0 •20 
BMI (kg m −2 ) 30 •3 10 •9 31 •5 11 •8 26 •9 7 •2 0 •19 
Race White 56 (93 •3) 42 (70 •0) 15 (25 •0) - 
S. Asian 1 (1 •7) 1 (1 •7) 0 - 
Black 1 (1 •7) 1 (1 •7) 0 - 
Other 2 (3 •4) 1 (1 •7) 1 (1 •7) 
SMID Decile 3 1-6 3 1-6 3 2-6 0 •43 
Diabetes 29 (48 •3) 20 (33 •3) 9 (15 •0) 0 •46 
Cancer 7 (11 •7) 5 (8 •3) 2 (3 •3) 1 •0 
CVD 23 (38 •3) 15 (25 •0) 8 (13 •3) 0 •26 
COPD 5 (8 •3) 2 (3 •3) 3 (5 •0) 0 •11 
PRD DN 22 (36 •7) 14 (23 •3) 8 (13 •3) - 
GN 9 (15 •0) 7 (11 •6) 2 (3 •3) 
Interstitial 16 (26 •7) 14 (23 •3) 2 (3 •3) 
Multisystem 8 (13 •3) 5 (8 •3) 3 (5 •0) 
Other 5 (8 •3) 4 (6 •7) 1 (1 •7) 
Dialysis vascular access AVF 26 (43 •3) 18 (30 •0) 8 (13 •3) - 
AVG 1 (1 •7) 0 - 1 (1 •7) 
Line 33 (55 •0) 26 (43 •3) 7 (11 •6) 
RRT time (yrs) 3 •3 1 •2-5 •8 3 •4 1 •1-5 •6 2 •8 1 •2-6 •1 0 •89 
Prev transplant 16 (26 •7) 13 (21 •7) 3 (5 •0) 0 •32 
WCC 6 •3 3 •5 5 •6 1 •9 8 •4 5 •5 0 •06 
Hb (g L −1 ) 104 •0 17 •3 105 •1 17 •0 101 •1 18 •2 0 •46 
Plts (10 9 L −1 ) 173 •9 66 •1 177 •3 58 •6 164 •3 85 •1 0 •58 
Neut (10 9 L −1 ) 4 •9 3 •3 4 •2 1 •8 6 •9 5 •3 0 •06 
Lymph(10 9 L −1 ) 0 •75 0 •35 0 •75 0 •34 0 •76 0 •38 0 •92 
NLR 7 •8 6 •9 6 •5 3 •9 11 •5 11 •1 0 •10 
CRP (mg L −1 ) 46 •0 - 44 •5 26 •3-77 •3 69 •0 35 •0-104 •0 0 •32 
CXR/CT Normal 7 (15 •9) 7 (15 •9) 0 - - 
Equivocal 22 (50 •0) 13 (29 •5) 9 (20 •5) 
Classical 14 (31 •8) 9 (20 •5) 5 (11 •4) (11 •4) 
Alt. diagnosis 1 (2 •3) 1 (2 •3) 0 - 
Ventilated No 58 (96 •7) 43 (71 •7) 15 (25 •0) - 
CPAP 1 (1 •7) 0 - 1 (1 •7) 
Invasive 1 (1 •7) 1 (1 •7) 0 - 
Abbreviations BMI – body mass index, CVD - cardiovascular disease, COPD - chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, PRD - primary renal disease, DN - diabetic 
nephropathy, GN - glomerulonephritis, AVF - arteriovenous fistula, AVG - arteriovenous graft, RRT - renal replacement therapy, WCC – white cell count, Hb –
haemoglobin, Plts - platelets, Neut – neutrophils, Lymph – lymphocytes, NLR – neutrophil to lymphocyte ratio, CXR - chest X-ray, CT –computed tomography 

































n CVR1404, making transmission from CVR780 to CVR1404 less 
ikely. The widespread distribution of UK40 lineages in the com- 
unity, the early preventative measures implemented by RDU1 
nd the lack of definitive epidemiological evidence for transmis- 
ion suggest that individual transmissions were not due to infec- 
ion prevention and control (IPC) challenges in this unit. The final 
ase occurred nine days after “lockdown” and the implementation 
f enhanced PPE measures. 
DU2 
In RDU2, there was evidence of five introductions of SARS-CoV- 
 from the community, of which two lineages spread within the 
nit or on hospital transport to the unit. CVR3289 and CVR3290 
ad indistinguishable sequences, only seen in two other non- 
eographically linked community cases. These patients shared the 
ame dialysis session and transport, with an estimated 100% proba- 
ility of within-unit transmission ( Fig. 2 , lineage UK658). Likewise, 
VR1003 and CVR1924 had indistinguishable sequences and shared 4 he same dialysis sessions ( Fig. 3 , lineage UK51). CVR2314 had a 
_RDU of 1, but this patient had no epidemiological link to other 
wo patients, suggesting nosocomial transmission from fomites or 
n untested staff member (staff were not routinely tested for SARS- 
oV-2, at this time). 
DU3, 4 and 5 
In RDU3, three introductions and two separate transmission 
vents were identified. Although CVR375 and CVR1511 had indis- 
inguishable sequences, this was shared with 161 other Scottish 
amples ( Fig. 2 , lineage UK5098). The SRT identified nosocomial 
nfection in CVR375 due to within-hospital rather than within- 
ialysis unit transmission (p_hADM 0.95). CVR1511 acquisition of 
nfection from RDU3 (p_RDU 0.68) was less clear. CVR1817 is a 
lose sequence match to CVR375 and CVR1511 based on the 2 
NP threshold, leading the SRT to estimate probable unit-based 
ransmission (p_RDU = 0.73). However, on phylogenetic analysis 
VR1817 falls into the separate UK501 lineage ( Fig. 2 ) and appears 
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Fig. 2. Phylogenetic tree showing the relationship of 39 sequences from RDU patients and additional SARS-CoV-2 genomes from Scotland. Sequences are colour-coded by 
RDU location. Dashed boxes highlight the UK lineage and are shown in more detail in Fig. 3 . The numerical suffixes of the CVR identifier indicate the posterior probability 
(as a percentage) of the patient acquiring SARS-CoV-2 from the RDU (p_RDU) or from the wider hospital where dialysis takes place (p_hRDU). The scale bar indicates 















ikely to have been community-acquired on consideration of all 
vailable information. In lineage UK39, CVR937 was community- 
cquired while the related CVR1816 was probable within-unit 
ransmission (p_RDU = 0.74). 
In RDU4, two patients tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 but there 
as no linkage found on sequence analysis (Supplementary Table 
) with no evidence of within unit transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in 
his dialysis unit. 5 Within RDU5, three cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection were 
etected. CVR1217 (lineage UK5098) was community-acquired 
hile CVR1843 (p_RDU of 0.9) was highly suggestive of 
ithin RDU transmission. These related sequences differed by 
 SNPs. This strongly suggests that intermediary modes of 
ransmission should ideally have been investigated, including 
ntested asymptomatic individuals, for example members of 
taff. 
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Fig. 3. Timeline of detection of first SARS-CoV-2 positive results in haemodialysis patients in RDUs with details of dialysis sessions and shared patient transport in relation 
to the UK lineage. The phylogenetic trees are derived from the dashed boxes in Fig. 2 . Circled numbers in the phylogenetic tree represent the number of indistinguishable 
sequences from Scotland for the given node on the phylogeny. The numerical suffixes of the CVR identifier indicate the posterior probability (as a percentage) of the patient 
acquiring SARS-CoV2 from the RDU or from another healthcare-related infection (i.e., hospital where dialysis takes place and ward and/or hospital they have been admitted 







































SARS-CoV-2 was introduced to RDU6 on at least 5 occasions 
ith evidence of onward transmission in two cases and hospital- 
ransmission in one. Of the 26 (12 •3% of total) SARS-CoV-2 pos- 
tive patients, 16 were sequenced. Nine of these patients were 
ithin the UK429 lineage ( Fig. 3 ). The SRT verified a high likeli-
ood of within-unit transmission, with p_RDU ranging from 0 •96 
o 1 ( Fig. 3 ). CVR3373 (p_RDU = 0, the first of this phylotype found
n RDU6) and CVR3362 were within a separate lineage, UK5098 
 Fig. 3 ). CVR3362 had been hospitalised for a month prior to 
he positive SARS-CoV-2 test, whilst maintaining dialysis within 
DU6 and had a p_RDU of 1. Further discussion with the infec- 
ion control team confirmed that CVR3379 (non-haemodialysis pa- 
ient) and another unsequenced SARS-CoV-2 positive haemodial- 
sis patient, shared the same hospital bay with CVR3362. It is 
ossible that SARS-CoV-2 was brought onto this bay by the other 
aemodialysis patient from their dialysis sessions on RDU6. This 
ighlights one of the limitations of phylogeny and the SRT al- 
orithm in an outbreak investigation – sequencing data needs 
o be representative of prevalent cases for the results to be in- 6 erpreted. Finally, CVR3732 ( Fig. 2 , UK370) had a high p_hRDU 
0 •96) indicating acquisition of SARS-CoV-2 from elsewhere in the 
ospital. 
ummary 
We found evidence of multiple introductions of SARS-CoV-2 
nfection into Scottish dialysis units and of onward transmission 
ithin these units. There was strong evidence for 15 patients ac- 
uiring SARS-CoV-2 in hospital or on shared hospital transport. 
or a further 9 patients the source of infection was less certain 
lthough most likely acquired within the hospital RDU setting 
In lineage UK40: CVR284, CVR495, CVR780, CVR1204, CVR1314, 
VR1404 were similar but multiple indistinguishable sequences 
ere also detected in the community; lineage UK5098: CVR1511; 
ineage UK39: CVR1816; lineage UK501: CVR1817). A further 15 pa- 
ients most likely acquired SARS-CoV-2 in the community (Supple- 
entary Table 1). RDU6 cases had a high likelihood of within-unit 
ransmission of SARS-CoV-2 and RDU6 also had one of the high- 
st rates of infection over the longest time period (31st March to 
6th May, Table 2 ). However, in RDU1, where the rate of infection 
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Table 2 
Number of patients treated at each RDU and proportion of patients infected with SARS-CoV-2 per RDU. 
Number of patients with 
SARS-CoV2 
Total number of 
patients treated 
Percentage diagnosed with 
SARS-CoV2 infection 
First case to final case 
detected (days) 
RDU1 9 60 15 •0 12 
RDU2 11 109 10 •1 38 
RDU3 7 104 6 •7 66 
RDU4 2 50 4 •0 9 
RDU5 3 137 2 •2 12 


































































































as also high, there was tentative evidence of within-unit trans- 
ission; infections occurred over 12 days, the incubation period of 
he last case was coincident with both “lockdown” and enhanced 
PE implementation. 
iscussion 
During the first wave of the UK pandemic, we studied SARS- 
oV-2 infections within 6 affected Scottish RDUs. Using a genomic 
pidemiology approach, we found that transmission of SARS-CoV-2 
ithin RDUs was common, affecting 8 •9% of dialysis patients with 
 very high associated mortality (27%) in keeping with other re- 
ent studies. 8–11 Many guidelines have evolved for the care of dial- 
sis patients to minimise risk of infection, including nosocomial 
ransmission of SARS-CoV-2. 5 , 6 , 24 Less is known around whether 
atients requiring dialysis are at greater risk of community trans- 
ission of SARS-CoV-2 and how infection in the dialysis units re- 
ates to viral exposure in the healthcare environment compared to 
hat in the community. Whole-genome sequencing provides high- 
evel resolution of SARS-CoV-2 genome and in combination with 
pidemiological data can facilitate our understanding of transmis- 
ion and evolution during pathogen outbreaks. 13 , 14 Applying care- 
ul analysis of data generated from the community and the hospi- 
al setting, we found risk was present both from community and 
ospital settings; almost always from within the RDUs themselves, 
ut on occasion from the wider hospital. Multiple introductions oc- 
urred into the dialysis units, reflecting the risks associated with 
ndividuals having increased contact with the community (includ- 
ng need for frequent travel to hospitals) as well as prolonged and 
egular contact within the RDUs themselves. Data from the Scot- 
ish Renal Registry suggest that measures introduced in early April 
o reduce this exposure, including the use of masks to and from 
ialysis and individual transport, were effective; with the number 
f cases in people receiving dialysis falling sharply two to three 
eeks before the rest of the general population within Scotland. 25 
n order to capitalise on the utility of such knowledge in hospital- 
utbreak management, the results from the sequencing data need 
o be generated in a timely manner. 15 , 17 However, the feasibil- 
ty of implementing this rapid sequencing response in the Na- 
ional Health Service to date has been impeded by lack of expertise 
nd equipment for both high-throughput whole-genome sequenc- 
ng and for processing the data generated into a form interpretable 
y infection control and public health. COG-UK has demonstrated 
hat near real-time sequencing is achievable at scale. 17 We used 
his framework and a novel statistical algorithm to characterise 
ransmission dynamics specifically in the haemodialysis cohort, a 
roup both at higher risk of severe outcome as well as having nu- 
erous healthcare interactions. 
A limitation of the study is the sequences available for anal- 
sis; accurate estimation of the likely source of infection depends 
n having sufficient sequences available from the community of af- 
ected patients and of cases from the hospital setting. Here, we ob- 7 ained sequences from two-thirds of the lab-detected SARS-CoV-2 
ases from RDU1-RDU5, and 44% for RDU6. We also compared data 
rom the RDUs with 944 other cases in the community, 700 inpa- 
ients and 546 samples taken from patients presenting in emer- 
ency departments in the same health boards as provide care for 
ialysis patients. Additionally, COVID-19 is asymptomatic in up to 
0% of patients, which may have reduced the number of infections 
aptured. 26 Further, early in the pandemic, HCWs were ineligible 
or testing. Frequent, regular testing of all HCWs and all patients, 
egardless of symptoms is warranted. There is also mounting evi- 
ence that HCWs have a higher seroprevalence for SARS-CoV-2 an- 
ibodies than the general population, with a high proportion being 
symptomatic. 27 , 28 
The low substitution rate of SARS-CoV-2 limits the granular- 
ty of outbreak analysis; as demonstrated in this study, indistin- 
uishable sequences may not be part of a transmission cluster if 
here is widespread circulation in the patients’ home communi- 
ies. To address this limitation, we employed the SRT, which com- 
ines sequence data with both temporal and geographic data to 
mprove estimates of within-unit and within-hospital versus com- 
unity transmission. Based on additional epidemiological evidence 
uch as timing of haemodialysis sessions and hospital transport, 
he SRT correctly identified a high probability of within-unit trans- 
ission for RDU 2, 3, 5 and 6. Less definitive results for RDU1, not 
mmediately apparent by phylogenetic investigation alone (due to 
he widespread presence the lineage within the community), af- 
rm its potential as a rapid tool to aid outbreak investigations. 
We confirm the findings of other published reports of SARS- 
oV-2 in the haemodialysis cohort that cases are at risk of poor 
utcomes, with no specific at-risk group identified based on co- 
orbid conditions. 9 The high mortality, dearth of therapeutics and 
ikely poor response to vaccines, 29 emphasises the need for tar- 
eted strategies to mitigate risk in this cohort. Identification of 
ajor transmission risks is vital to address outbreaks in this vul- 
erable group where there is prolonged, unavoidable contact be- 
ween healthcare settings and the local community. Whilst univer- 
al infection control measures are beneficial, we identified multi- 
le community-acquired infections, with RDUs being an interface 
or transmission. Additional measures may be required to reduce 
nfection in this setting. Longer, more extreme periods of intensive 
ocial distancing (‘shielding’) to reduce contact with other individ- 
als may be required when the community incidence of infection 
s high. Knowledge of the dominant site of transmission can justify 
nd provide precision to the recommendation to shield and con- 
ense the period of isolation, loneliness and distress in this cohort, 
ho already have a high incidence of depression. 
Although we demonstrate the utility of identifying the likeli- 
ood of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 infection around treatment 
entres for haemodialysis, our findings have resonance for any 
roup requiring frequent attendance in healthcare facilities, such 
s patients undergoing chemotherapy, radiotherapy or outpatient 
ehabilitation. 
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Data sharing statement 
Will individual participant data be available? Yes, in anonymised form 
What data in particular will be shared? Individual participant data that underlie the results reported in this article, after de-identification. 
Sequences and de-identified metadata is available on MRC-CLIMB through COG-UK. Sequences are also 
available on GISAID. 
What other documents will be available? Study protocol, statistical analysis, analytic code 
When will data be available? Immediately following publication, no end date 
With whom? Researchers who provide a methodologically sound proposal 
For what types of analysis? To achieve aims in the approved proposal 
By what mechanism will data be made 
available? 
Proposals should be directed to contact@cogconsortium.uk 
(Statement from COG-UK consortium: “We are committed to open science, and sharing all data that we can as 
rapidly as possible. This includes sharing data for use by Public Health authorities internationally, to support 
COVID-19 response, and sharing data in such a way that the academic community can access and use the data 
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